The view of concepts developed here should be contrasted with the conventional alternatives of intrinsicism and subjectivism that were discussed earlier (pp. 1.3:13-4). Contrary to the intrinsicist view, concepts are mental integrations and therefore do not exist independently of the observer, but are abstractions in the observer's mind. Furthermore, they are formed by isolating attributes that do not appear in isolated form in reality. For instance, "redness" does not exist independently, but is merely an attribute of "red" existents.
Contrary to the subjectivist view, valid concepts must not be disconnected from outer reality. Indeed, their very function is cognitive: to enable one to know that reality. While most possible groupings of units would not serve that function effectively, the units integrated by a concept are bound by real similarities and are distinguished from other units by real differences.
Among subjectivists, who remain dominant in academia, the only notion of "objectivity" is a policy (sometimes called inter-subjectivity) of providing "equal time" to as many different subjective viewpoints as possible (
). To the subjectivist, there are no "facts of reality," only various expressions of consciousness. 
Previous
