The popular notion that theory must be divorced from reality derives from this analytic/synthetic dichotomy. In one variation, it is assumed that all theories are only idealized "models" of reality. Certainly, scientists may utilize models in the course of developing theories. Ultimately, however, their theories must move beyond models to describe reality directly; otherwise the models are but idle playthings. For example, early in Section 4 ("Praxeology") a model of a free market without uncertainty will be developed. Later, however, we will endeavor to explain in just what ways the real world of uncertainties (and systems other than free markets) differs from that initial model, which serves only as a point of departure. The model, in other words, is but one component of the theory, conceptually necessary but incomplete by itself.

If our concepts are not arbitrary, and if our knowledge has been developed by an objective, step-by-step methodology, then we can make rational judgments as to whether or not the sun will rise tomorrow, as well as more complex questions of human action. Our theories are then not theories about models, but theories about reality, and the presumed gulf between theory and practice vanishes.