The intrinsicist, subjectivist, and Objectivist views of concepts examined in Section 1 apply in particular to value concepts. The intrinsicist regards values as inherent in some imperceptible dimension of reality. These intrinsic values cannot be discovered by scientific examination, but must be sensed by one's feelings—that is, by the dictates of "conscience," which are not subject to rational analysis. The subjectivist, on the other hand, argues that "right" and "wrong" are whatever we wish to define them to be, either individually or collectively. Both of these ethical views give primacy (at least implicitly) to consciousness as the determinant of values. In contrast, the Objectivist view, as we saw in Section 1, holds that concepts must relate to reality and must be accessible to objective inquiry. This conclusion applies even to "ought" concepts. If the latter did not derive from reality, then they would serve no cognitive or communicative purpose and hence would not belong in our languages.