• In a variation on the same argument, proponents contend that would-be competitors have not proven a "public need" for additional providers. As we have seen, the "public" is not an organism (pp. 2.4:3-9) and thus has no needs apart from those of the individuals who compose it; hence the term "public need" has no scientific validity. If the opponents of competition intend to assert that market demand is insufficient to support multiple providers, then clearly the additional competitors will not find this market profitable; consequently, a coercive policy excluding them is again totally superfluous. In any case, such decisions, as we shall see in Section 5, are most efficiently determined by a decentralized marketplace, not by a central omnipotent authority.

• Alternatively, the proponents may predict that the good provided by private sellers will be inferior in quality. As already noted, however, goods of inferior quality (or exorbitantly priced goods) are far more likely to be generated by a coercive monopoly, insulated from both present and potential competition. Furthermore, our analysis of consumer regulation has shown the devastating consequences of substituting the values of a political "authority" for the voluntary choices of consumers (pp. 4.11:59-77).     

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