In order to avoid the exclusion of class-C workers from the market resulting from the simplistic "equal pay for equal work" requirement, regulators may require in addition that employers continue to hire class-C workers to the same extent as previously—or, perhaps, in proportions comparable to other workers. The combined effect of these two requirements is to create a form of wage subsidy, as defined earlier (p. 4.11:155). Because some of the more productive non-class-C workers can now no longer be legally employed unless certain numbers of class-C workers are also included in the labor force, their productivity is in effect artificially decreased, and their wages must be reduced in order to hire some of the less productive class-C workers at comparable wages. The principal effect of this subsidy is that particular jobs are no longer filled by the most productive workers, so that overall productivity is impaired, leading to decreases in wages and general prosperity.

In order to maximize their profits and their value scales, employers will continue to search for methods of hiring workers according to their true productivity. These methods will entail noncompliance with either the specific provisions or the intentions of the law—i. e., the exploitation of loopholes, a resort to illegal tactics, or both. The specific methods employed will vary according to whether or not the anti-discrimination regulation is implemented by means of numerical quotas.