In a social context, furthermore, values such as health care cannot be elevated to the status of "rights." Nor can they be enforced consistently without coercively interfering with the action of others—that is, without violating rights. In order to enforce person X's supposed "right to health care," for instance, it would be necessary to require a doctor to treat X, either at no charge or for whatever fee was deemed applicable to that "right." Such a requirement, however, would violate the doctor's right to her own life, liberty, and property (specifically, her labor). But if the alleged "right to health care" conflicts logically with other rights, then it cannot be included within an epistemologically coherent concept of rights. If it is included, then "rights" is reduced to an anti-concept (p. 1.3:47).
Such so-called "rights" as health care, of course, stem from a notion of "freedom from wants," previously debunked as an absurd attempt to escape the laws of nature (pp. 5.2:13-6).
Note that the rights concept, like its antecedent freedom, pertains only to individuals, that is, to biologically separate and metaphysically independent human beings. Any attempt to assign rights to other kinds of entities, such as "society," social groupings, or fetuses, leads to a contradiction, since any such so-called "rights" could not be enforced without taking away rights and enslaving individuals. 
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