Even if this problem of definition could be solved, the egalitarian viewpoint would remain highly problematic. Suppose, for example, that some standard of "adjusted income" were developed to measure economic well-being, taking into account factors like those just cited, and that the equalization of "adjusted incomes" among individuals or households were declared an ethical end in itself, independently of other considerations. By implication, we should then in some cases have to reject a policy that might raise the "adjusted income" of the "have-nots," because that policy would raise the "adjusted income" of some "haves" even further, thereby increasing inequality to an "unconscionable" degree. For instance, suppose that Program P would increase the income of households in a $0-20,000 "adjusted-income" bracket by 10%, while simultaneously increasing the income of households in the $20,001-and-up bracket by 20%. (Program P might, for instance, consist of legislation repealing certain coercive interventions into the market.) Clearly, Program P would improve standards of living for low-income families. Yet it would also increase the degree of inequality among incomes, both in absolute and percentage terms, and would therefore have to be rejected according to the criterion of "economic equality."

On the other hand, if our concern is for the welfare of the "have-nots," rather than "equality" per se, then we should embrace P and similar programs, flatly repudiating the egalitarian argument.